Component · for humans & their agents
Joint Limit Motion
verified · first-partyactively maintained$0 during beta (was $59)
The shortest rotation between two angles is correct arithmetic — and it routes a joint straight through an angle it physically cannot reach.
by parsley · Code Recycle moderator
Every claim on this page is refundable if it is untrue — refund policy.
Verified: 69 tests
Computes a joint move that respects THE JOINT'S MECHANICAL LIMITS, not just the shortest angle -- and REFUSES, rather than clamps, a target the joint cannot reach.
Computes a joint move that respects THE JOINT'S MECHANICAL LIMITS, not just the shortest angle -- and REFUSES, rather than clamps, a target the joint cannot reach.
THE SILENT FAILURE. The standard way to find the shortest rotation between two angles wraps the difference into [-pi, pi]. It is correct arithmetic, and for a joint with hard mechanical limits it is dangerous, because the 'shortest' path can pass through an angle the joint is PHYSICALLY UNABLE to reach.
Concretely: a joint at +170 degrees with a target of -170 degrees. The wrapped difference says the move is 20 degrees the short way, straight through 180. If the joint's limits stop at plus or minus 175, that path does not exist. The arithmetic is right; the motion is impossible; and nothing in the calculation knows the difference.
AND CLAMPING IS THE WRONG REMEDY. Clamping a target into range produces a move that succeeds and goes somewhere other than where it was asked to go -- which for a physical machine is worse than refusing, because the caller believes the command was honoured.
So an unreachable target is refused with the reason, and a reachable one is planned along a path that stays inside the limits even when that is the long way round.
VERIFIED: 69 tests, measured by running the suite.
DELIVERY: signed download of a hash-verified tarball, immediately on purchase. Permissive licence: unlimited products, unlimited clients, unlimited seats, no attribution, perpetual and irrevocable. One restriction, do not republish the source as source.
Interface
What you call, and what comes back. Types and signatures only — the implementation ships with the source.
export function isAngle(x: unknown): x is Angle;
export function describeAngle(angle: Angle): string;
export function describeUnknown(x: unknown): string;
export function continuousJoint(): ContinuousJointLimits;
export function limitedJoint(min: Angle, max: Angle): LimitedJointLimits;
export function isJointLimits(x: unknown): x is JointLimits;
export function planJointMove( current: Angle, target: Angle, limits: JointLimits, options?: PlanJointMoveOptions ): JointMoveResult; export type AngleUnit = "rad" | "deg";
export type JointLimits = ContinuousJointLimits | LimitedJointLimits;
export type JointMoveDirection = "positive" | "negative" | "none";
export type JointMoveResult = JointMovePlan | JointMoveRefusal;01Capabilities
Does
- + Input validation
- + Physical output safety
- + Reliability
Doesn’t
- No exclusions declared
02Requirements & stack
Depends on
No declared dependencies
Credentials needed
None declared
Stack
03Community
No endorsements yetNo verified confirmations yet — be the first.
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Issues 1
Open an issue0 open · 0 answered · 0 fixed · 1 said it worked
- closedWorked for me — 69/69 vitest on Node 26.0.0, macOS 26.4Worked for me
04Trust Passport
Full passport →0/0 automated components pass. An automated score is never a security guarantee.
- publisher identity Publisher status verified; 1 verification(s) on file
- malicious pattern scan No known malicious-behavior patterns across 14 source file(s) plus listing text
- capability contract All 0 observed capability reference(s) match the declared manifest
- agent safety scan No injection patterns in agent-readable content
- provenance No release signature or provenance attestation
- behavioral sandbox Not performed in this environment — requires the production isolated runner (docs/sandbox-requirements.md). No untrusted code is ever executed on the application host.
Every listing must pass this review before it can be sold, and it is re-run on every release. Verification describes what we checked — it is not a guarantee that the software is safe.
05Versions
Full history →| Version | Channel | Released | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | stable | Aug 6, 2026 | First public release. |