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Component · for humans & their agents

SSRF-Safe Webhook Fetch

verified · first-partyactively maintained$0 during beta (was $49)

Blocking 169.254.169.254 is the part everyone does. It is also the part that does not stop the attack.

by saltyhash · Code Recycle admin

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Every claim on this page is refundable if it is untrue — refund policy.

Verified: 38 tests

A drop-in outbound fetch for buyer-supplied URLs that closes the three ways an SSRF guard is usually bypassed: a hostname that resolves to a private address, a redirect that lands somewhere the original check approved, and DNS rebinding between the check and the connection.

A drop-in outbound fetch for buyer-supplied URLs that closes the three ways an SSRF guard is usually bypassed: a hostname that resolves to a private address, a redirect that lands somewhere the original check approved, and DNS rebinding between the check and the connection.

The common implementation blocks a denylist of literal addresses. That stops a copy-pasted exploit and nothing else, because the attacker controls DNS. Here, resolution happens once and the connection is pinned to the address that was checked, redirects are re-validated at every hop, and the allow decision is made on resolved addresses rather than on the string a user typed.

The failure this prevents is not a crash. It is a webhook that quietly fetches a cloud metadata endpoint and returns credentials in the response body.

DELIVERY: signed download of a hash-verified tarball, immediately on purchase. Permissive licence: unlimited products, unlimited clients, unlimited seats, no attribution, perpetual and irrevocable. One restriction, do not republish the source as source.

Interface

What you call, and what comes back. Types and signatures only — the implementation ships with the source.

  export function isPrivateIp(ipRaw: string): boolean;
  export async function assertSafeWebhookUrl(raw: string): Promise<;

01Capabilities

Does

  • + Webhooks
  • + SSRF prevention
  • + URL validation

Doesn’t

  • No exclusions declared

02Requirements & stack

Depends on

No declared dependencies

Credentials needed

None declared

Stack

typescript

03Community

No endorsements yet

No verified confirmations yet — be the first.

Confirmations come from verified purchasers, installers, vetted reviewers, or an installation outcome your org reported through the agent tools. They grade quality — security is verified separately, and community votes can never override the security gate.

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0 open · 0 answered · 0 fixed · 1 said it worked

04Trust Passport

Full passport →
–/100

0/0 automated components pass. An automated score is never a security guarantee.

✓ Verified · first-partyreviewed Sep 20, 2026 · re-verification due Dec 19, 2026
  • publisher identity Publisher status verified; 1 verification(s) on file
  • malicious pattern scan No known malicious-behavior patterns across 10 source file(s) plus listing text
  • capability contract All 0 observed capability reference(s) match the declared manifest
  • agent safety scan No injection patterns in agent-readable content
  • provenance No release signature or provenance attestation
  • behavioral sandbox Not performed in this environment — requires the production isolated runner (docs/sandbox-requirements.md). No untrusted code is ever executed on the application host.

Every listing must pass this review before it can be sold, and it is re-run on every release. Verification describes what we checked — it is not a guarantee that the software is safe.

VersionChannelReleasedNotes
1.0.0stableAug 3, 2026First public release.